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Casenota
ESTATE TAX - "Possession or Enjoyment"
under 2036 - O'Malley v. United States (F. Supp. 1963)
I. THE O'MALLEY FACTS
Decedent had placed three Wisconsin farms in irrevocable
trusts, naming his daughters beneficiaries and himself and two
others as trustees. Decedent had then orally leased, occupied and
paid rent for these three farms. While occupying these farms as a
tenant he placed and maintained improvements upon them. In
determining decedent's estate tax liability, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue added to the gross estate the value of the farm
improvements, relying upon the wording of section 2036 (a) 1 of the
Internal Revenue Code which states:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property
... to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent
has at any time made a transfer ... under which he has retained
for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference
to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before
his death (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to
the income from, the property or (2) the right, either alone or in
conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall
possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.
The question decided by the court2 was whether the decedent
maintained the "possession or enjoyment" of the farm improvements
as contemplated by the statute. Judge Campbell, stated that,
"[Decedent] did retain possession and enjoyment of the improve-
ments for a period which did not end before his death, and accord-
ingly I find the Commissioner properly included the improvements
in his estate."3 In other portions of the opinion the court held that
the improvements would also be includable in decedent's gross
estate because they were trade fixtures under Wisconsin law and
removable by the tenant.4 Even if the fixtures had not been re-
movable from the land, it is likely that the property would have
been subject to taxation because of decedent's power to pay or
1For convenience the references in the text are to 2036 which is the
present statutory number. The case was decided under INT. REV. CoDE
of 1939, § 811(c) which is identical to 2036. The statutes prior to 1939
were INT. REV. CODE of 1932, § 830 (a) and INT. REV. CODE of 1926, §
302 (c).
2 0'Malley v. United States, 220 F.Supp. 30 (1963) (N.D. Ill. E.D.).
3Id. at 35.
4 Old Line Ins. Co. of America v. Hawn, 225 Wis. 627, 275 N.W. 542 (1937).
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accumulate income which had made the underlying land subject to
taxation. The difficulty of the decision rests in the breadth and
consequences of the argument advanced by the Commissioner and
approved by the court.
IL POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE O'MALLEY INTERPRETATION
With respect to income-producing property the clause of sub-
section 1 of section 2036 (a) which reads "the possession or enjoy-
ment of, or the right to the income from, the property" can mean
that the retained possession or enjoyment of any property is
sufficient to tax it to the decedent's estate. It can also mean that
when the property is income-producing (such as the farm improve-
ments in the instant case) the decedent must retain the right to the
income thereof before it will be included in his estate for tax
purposes. Under the latter view, the retention of the income would
be the exclusive requisite in the case of income-producing property.
The possession or enjoyment of such property will not subject it
to the estate tax. The effect of such an interpretation is far-reach-
ing. If taxable the tax is not limited to the value of the retained
interest. Section 2036 subjects the value of all transferred property,
in which the transferor has retained possession or enjoyment, to
the estate tax.
The holding of O'Malley that the retention of possession or
enjoyment of income producing property is sufficient to tax the
property to the decedent's estate under section 2036 may destroy
the efficacy of some estate plans. For example, a father who con-
veys his farm to his children and then leases it back retains the
possession and enjoyment of the land. Under O'Malley this may
be sufficient to tax the farm to his estate.
Another possible plan which is foreclosed by the decision is
where Husband conveys income producing property, such as a
farm, to himself and Wife as tenants in common. Although Wife
as a tenant in common has a right to one-half of the income, Hus-
band has, at least, a non-exclusive right to possess and enjoy the
property. Upon Husband's death, unless Husband must have re-
tained the right to the income from the property before it can be
included in his estate, Wife's half interest may be taxed to Hus-
band's estate under the "possession or enjoyment" part of the
statute.5
Professor Casner states that under this arrangement the transferor will
not retain "possession or enjoyment" within the meaning of 2036
since his right to possession of the whole is subject to the transferee's
right of partition. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNI-G 414 n.45 (3d ed. 1961).
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Another potential trouble area is where a settlor creates an
irrevocable trust of income producing property with an independent
trustee, giving the trustee absolute discretion to pay the income
from the trust to either the settlor, his children, or any other desig-
nated persons, with the corpus to go to the children or other
beneficiaries upon the death of the settlor. The trustee then pays
all the income to the settlor. The settlor has retained no right to
the income, but has he retained the possession or enjoyment of
the property since he actually received the benefits from it? If
he has, then upon his death the corpus of the trust will be taxed
to his estate even though the property was irrevocably transferred
and the decedent retained only a possibility of receiving any of the
income from it. A finding that the receipt of income from a trust
is, in the absence of any prearrangement, retained possession or
enjoyment within section 2036 raises the possibility that the settlor
may be considered to have retained possession and enjoyment even
if the trustee does in fact pay no income to the settlor. The trustee
owes a duty to all trust beneficiaries. Granting that a trustee's
duty concerning discretionary payments is only to make a reason-
able exercise or non-exercise of the discretion,6 it is possible that
either the trustee's duty to act or the possibility of income itself
could constitute retained "possession or enjoyment".
Certain estate plans dealing with family corporations may also
be subject to attack under this section of the statute. A father,
owner of a growing corporation, may wish to convey the growth to
his children while keeping the corporate control and the present
corporate worth for himself. He can do this by capitalizing the
present worth of the corporation into voting-preferred shares,
which he retains for himself, and giving common shares, with less
voting power than the preferred (or none at all), to his children.
Thus the father retains the control and management and also the
present value of the company through his voting-preferred stock,
while the growth of the company is absorbed by the common stock
of the children. Upon his death, however, the common shares held by
the children may be taxed to the father's estate if the father's reten-
tion of corporate management and control is found to be a retention
of "possession or enjoyment" of the corporation.
7
6 Scully v. Scully, 162 Neb. 368, 76 N.W.2d 239 (1956).
7A variation of this problem would occur where an owner of farm land
would incorporate his farms and then give a portion of the shares to
his children or others while retaining majority control for himself.
This arrangement would enable him to retain possession and enjoy-
ment of the land and at the same time allow him to make a present
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III. THE HISTORY OF "RIGHT TO INCOME"
The phrase "or the right to the income from, the property"
has not always been included within the statute.
8 Prior to 1931
the statute stated that the property would be taxed to the de-
cedent's estate "To the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise,
in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or en-
joyment at or after his death.. . ."9 In May v. Heiner10 the Court
held that the transfer of property in trust with a reservation of a
life estate in the income thereof was not a transfer intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death within the
meaning of section 2036.
The next year the Court decided Burnet v. Northern Trust
Co.," and two companion cases,12 affirming, and in fact, extending,
the rule of May v. Heiner13 that a reservation of a life estate in the
income of a trust by the settlor does not make the property tax-
able to the settlor's estate.
Congress responded to these decisions the next day by passing
a joint resolution which amended the statute to tax transfers where-
in the transferor retained a life estate in the income.14 This resolu-
conveyance of part of the land. The question raised here is whether such
retained possession and enjoyment along with any salary the donor
might receive as manager of the land will subject that portion of the
land represented by the transferred shares to the estate tax upon the
donor's death. Under the present interpretations of 2036 such a result
is possible.
8 For a detailed history of this statute see LOWNDES & KRA1VIER, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXEs 80-98 (2d ed. 1962).
9 Int. Rev. Code of 1926, § 302 (c).
10 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
11 283 U.S. 782 (1931).
12 Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783 (1931); McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S.
784 (1931).
1
3 In Northern Trust, Morsman, and McCormick, the decedent had reserved
a direct life estate to himself, while in May v. Heiner the decedent had
reserved a secondary life estate. Apparently the government thought
that the Court might distinguish a direct reservation of a life estate from
the secondary reservation in Heiner and uphold a tax upon the former.
LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXEs 86 (2d ed. 1962).
14 46 Stat. 1516 (1931). With minor changes, the resolution was incorporated
into law the following year. INT. REV. CODE of 1932, § 803(a). Note this is
the same as § 2036.
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tion was hurriedly enacted to close a very apparent loop-hole and
therefore little Congressional discussion can be found indicating
the legislative intent. However, the resolution was obviously
passed in response to the four decisions discussed above and some
Congressional intent can be inferred from this fact alone. At the
time of the passage of the resolution, Congress Imew that under
May v. Heiner and subsequent cases the phrase "possession and en-
joyment" did not reach retained life estates in the income of trans-
ferred property. The phrase "income from the property" was in-
corporated into the resolution to tax retained life estates in the
income of transferred property which May v. Heiner had held were
not covered by the "possession and enjoyment" language of the
old statute. From these facts, one can reasonably find that the
"possession and enjoyment" section of the statute was intended to
cover transfers of non-income producing property, while the "right
to the income" section was intended to cover transfers of income
producing property. Although Commissioner v. Church's Estate5
has overruled May v. Heiner the meaning of the statute is to be
determined in light of the law in effect at the time the statute was
enacted.
Furthermore, in 1949 Congress re-enacted 2036 with some minor
amendments. 6 One of these amendments was in response to
Church's Estate. Under it, the law reverts to what it was before
May v. Heiner was overruled. Prior to this 1949 re-enactment, a
conference committee was formed to settle differences between
the House and Senate versions of the amendments. In a subse-
quently issued report this committee stated: 1
7
The income interests described by section [2036] and by similar
language elsewhere in the conference amendments include reserved
rights to the income from transferred property and rights to
possess or enjoy non-income-producing property. Such interests
also include a reserved power to designate the persons who shall,
during the decendent's life or during any lesser period described in
section [2036], receive the income from transferred property or
who shall, during any such period, possess or enjoy non-income-
producing property.
This passage indicates that Congress recognized a distinction be-
tween income and non-income producing property at a time when
it was amending and re-enacting the revenue statutes.
15 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
16 63 Stat. 891 (1949).
17 H.R. Rep. No. 1412 (Conf.), 81st Cong. 1st Sess., p. 11.
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The regulations to section 2036 (a) (2) also seem to recognize
this dictinction stating that: 18
The phrase 'right ... to designate the person or persons who
shall possess or enjoy the transferred property or the income
therefrom' includes a reserved power to designate the person or
persons to receive the income from the transferred property, or to
possess or enjoy non-income-producing property, during the
decedent's life or during any other period described in paragraph
(a) of this section .... The phrase, however, does not include a
power over the transferred property itself which does not affect
the enjoyment of the income received or earned during the de-
cedent's life.
However, the regulations to section 2036 (a) (1) agree with the inter-
pretation given it by O'Malley: 19
The 'use, possession, right to the income, or other enjoyment
of the transferred property' is considered as having been retained
by or reserved to the decedent to the extent that the use, posses-
sion, right to the income, or other enjoyment is to be applied
toward the discharge of a legal obligation of the decedent, or
otherwise for his pecuniary benefit.
IV. JUDICIAL REACTION TO "RIGHT TO INCOME"
The first case interpreting the phrase "possession or enjoy-
ment" after the statute was amended by the joint resolution was
McNichol v. Commissioner.20 In this case decedent had conveyed
income-producing real property to his children with an oral under-
standing that he would receive the rentals therefrom for the
remainder of his life, which rentals he then actually received. The
court held that this property was properly included in his estate
for tax purposes, finding that "the right to income" included the
actual receipt of income without any legal right to it. Since there
was an oral agreement that decedent should retain a life estate
in the rental income, the decision of the court in this regard was
correct. However, the court also found that the decedent "enjoyed"
the property within the meaning of the "possession or enjoyment"
phrase.
Skinner v. United States21 is in accord with McNichol. In
Skinner the settlor of a trust gave the trustees absolute discretion
whether to pay the settlor the income of the trust. The trustees
18 26 C.F.R. § 20.2036-1 (b) (3) (1961).
1926 C.F.R. § 20.2036-1 (b)(2) (1961).
20 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959).
21197 F. Supp. E.D.Pa. 726 (1961), aff'd, 316 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963).
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actually paid the settlor the income during her life and from this
the court inferred an oral agreement to do so. In interpreting the
statute the court stated: 
2 2
It can be easily seen that this statute states three alternatives
under each one of which property may be included in the gross
estate: (1) if the decedent retains the 'possession' of the property
transferred or (2) 'enjoyment' of the property or (3) the 'right
to the income' from the property.
It was concluded that the decedent had retained the "enjoyment"
of the property.
Two years before McNichol, Uhl v. Commissioner23 was deter-
mined under the "right to the income" language of section 2036.
In this case, decedent had created an irrevocable trust, retaining
the right to one hundred dollars monthly from the income. The
trustee had uncontrolled discretion over all other income to pay
more than one hundred dollars to decedent if it deemed it advis-
able. That part of the corpus necessary to produce one hundred
dollars per month was included in decedent's estate. The remaining
part of the corpus was excluded. The court held the decedent's
possibility of receiving more than one hundred dollars was not a
retention of a right to the income which would tax the property
to his estate. Uhl differs from McNichol and Skinner only in the
fact that the trustee under his discretionary powers did not pay
Uhl any of the trust income. Since in both McNichoi and Skinner
the court found an oral agreement that the transferor should retain
the income from the transferred property, the holdings that the
properties were properly taxed to the decedent's estates are correct
under the "right to the income" phrase of the statute. However,
the holdings that the enjoyment of the income is the enjoyment
intended by Congress under the "possession or enjoyment" section
of the statute seems incorrect.
If in McNichol there had been no oral agreement and the
children had voluntarily reconveyed the rental income to their
father, it would seem an injustice to include the property in the
father's estate upon his death. A similar injustice would occur in
Skinner if the court found no agreement and the trustee had an
absolute and unqualified discretion to pay the income to the
settlor or not as he saw fit. In both cases, although the transferor
has received the benefits and enjoyment of the property, he has
not "retained the income." It has been voluntarily reconveyed to
22 Id. at 728.
23 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957).
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him by the transferee. This voluntary reconveyance of income
to the transferor seems to provide him with a "possession or enjoy-
ment" of the property that is entirely different from the "posses-
sion or enjoyment" intended by Congress to subject the property
to the estate tax. As was correctly held in Uhl, only that part of
the corpus necessary to produce income that the decedent has re-
tained a right to, should be taxed to the decedent's estate under
2036.
V. CONCLUSION
As of yet the courts have not been faced squarely with the
question of whether in the case of income producing property, a
retained "possession or enjoyment" is enough to tax it to one's
estate under 2036. Thus far there has either been no transfer of
the property in question or the courts have found a retention of
the "right to the income." It is inevitable, however, that the issue
will one day have to be faced. The answer is not clear, but in look-
ing at the reasons for the joint resolution that amended the statute
in 1931, and the later Congressional interpretation of the statute
in the conference report of 1949, the balance is on the side of
recognizing a distinction between income and non-income producing
property.24 On the other hand, the dicta propounded by the courts
thus far seems to find no distinction between income and non-in-
come producing property so far as the "possession or enjoyment"
section of the statute is concerned.
25
Lloyd I. Hoppner '65
24 One commentator is of the definite opinion that where there is income-
producing property there must be a retention of the right to the in-
come before the property can be taxed to the decedent's estate. Covey,
Section 2036-The New Problem Child of the Federal Estate Tax, 4 TAx
COUNSELOR'S Q. 121, 122-31 (1960).
25 Indicative of the expanding use of 2036 is the Commissioner's position
that gifts of the family residence from a husband to his wife remain
includable in his gross estate. See A. B. A. Bull. of the Section of Taxa-
tion, July 1964, p. 130. Formerly, the husband's continued residence in
the home was not considered a retention of possession or enjoyment.
See LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 141 (2d ed.
1962).
